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Abstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoﬀs among
eﬃciency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We ana-
lyze a model with indiﬀerences–ties–in school preferences. Simulations with ﬁeld data and
the theory favor breaking indiﬀerences the same way at every school –single tie breaking–
in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any ineﬃciency associated with
a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally,
we empirically document the extent of potential eﬃciency loss associated with strategy-
proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.
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1In 2003-04, the authors of this paper assisted the New York City Department of Edu-
cation (NYCDOE) in redesigning the student assignment mechanism used to match over
90,000 entering students to public high schools each year (Atila Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Parag
A. Pathak and Alvin E. Roth 2005). The old system - three rounds of a decentralized
process of oﬀers, acceptances, and wait lists with counterproductive incentives and insuf-
ﬁcient oﬀers to clear the market - was replaced with a more centralized single-oﬀer system
based on a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm adapted to satisfy various
constraints of the NYCDOE.
The NYCDOE initially contacted us because they were familiar with the design of the
medical match (see Roth 1984, Roth and Elliot Peranson 1999). And much of the theory
on which the design of the new student assignment mechanism was based involves the same
kind of matching theory (see Abdulkadiro˘ glu and Tayfun S¨ onmez 2003). But much of the
prior theory of two-sided matching concentrates on the case that all parties have strict
preferences, mainly because indiﬀerences in preferences were viewed as a “knife-edge”
phenomenon in applications like labor markets (cf. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor 1990).
In contrast, a primary feature of school choice in NYC and in other cities including Boston
(in which a new design was implemented in 2006, see Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak, Roth, and
S¨ onmez 2005, 2006) is that there are indiﬀerences–ties– in how students are ordered by at
least some schools. How to break these ties raised some signiﬁcant design decisions, which
have potentially important strategic and welfare consequences (cf. Aytek Erdil and Haluk
Ergin 2008). This paper describes those decisions, and evaluates them both empirically
and with the aid of some new theory involving the tradeoﬀs among eﬃciency, stability,
and strategy-proofness.
In two-sided matching models (David E. Gale and Lloyd S. Shapley 1962), there are
two disjoint sets of agents, students and schools. Every agent is an active strategic player
with preferences over the agents in the other set.1 A matching of students to schools (that
respects the relevant capacity constraints) is stable if it is individually rational and there
is no blocking pair of a student and a school who each prefer to be assigned to one another
than to their mate in the matching.2 Stable matchings are Pareto eﬃcient with respect to
the set of all agents, and in the core of the market whose rules are that any pair of agents
1Gale and Shapley (1962) phrased their discussion in a school choice context as a “college admissions”
problem and studied the set of stable matchings. Michel Balinski and S¨ onmez (1999) considered the theory of
two-sided matching in relation to college admissions where ordering of students at colleges are determined via
students’ scores at an entrance exam. Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003) introduced the problem of student
assignment in school choice. Gale and Shapley already considered non-strict preferences (albeit obliquely), but
concentrated on the case of strict preferences.
2Stable matchings may be relevant even when all schools are passive. In this case, stable matchings eliminate
“justiﬁed envy.” See Abdulkadiro˘ glu (2005), Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003) and Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Pathak,
Roth and S¨ onmez (2006) for discussion in the context of Boston’s new student assignment mechanism.
2on opposite sides of the market may be matched (subject to capacity constraints) if and
only if they both agree. The current system in NYC involves some schools that are active
strategic players that rank students in terms of preferences, while others use exogenous
criteria–priorities– to passively rank students. When schools actively rank students, if
there is a blocking pair, the school has an incentive to circumvent the match to enroll
the students it would prefer. This was an important feature of the old system in NYC,
when some schools concealed capacity in an eﬀort to be matched later with preferable
students.3 Empirical observations suggest that centralized matching mechanisms in labor
markets are most often successful if they produce stable matchings (Roth 1991, 2002,
2008). Therefore, the fact that both schools and students are active participants in New
York called for a stable matching algorithm for the NYC High School Match.
A second desideratum guiding the design was that the school match process should
promote student welfare to the extent possible; that is, it should be eﬃcient for students.
Indeed, the old system was not even capable of generating enough oﬀers to clear the
market and “[i]t [was] not unusual for up to 45 percent of students who apply to schools
outside their neighborhood to be rejected by all their choices,” after which they would be
assigned administratively, without regard for their stated preferences.4 When preferences
are strict, a class of deferred acceptance algorithms identify a stable match that is optimal
for one or the other sides of the market, in the sense that every agent on one side of
the market does at least as well at their optimal stable matching as at any other stable
matching (Gale and Shapley 1962).
A third concern was the gaming aspect of the old system. Some schools gave higher
priority to those students who ranked them as a ﬁrst or second choice. This information
was made public in the Directory of Public High Schools by NYCDOE. Consequently,
students were forced to make a strategic decision while ranking schools. As a result,
strategy-proofness for students, which requires that it should be a dominant strategy
to state true preferences, became the third goal of the design. There do not exist any
stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for all agents. None are strategy-proof for
schools matched to more than one student, but the student-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism, which produces the student-optimal stable matching, is strategy-proof for the
students (Lester E. Dubins and David Freedman (1981), Roth (1982, 1985)).
One way to think about these three design concerns is that Pareto eﬃciency for the
students is the primary welfare goal, but that stability of the matching, and strategy-
proofness in the elicitation of student preferences are incentive constraints that likely
3E.g. the Deputy Chancellor of Schools, quoted in the New York Times (11/19/04): “Before you might have
a situation where a school was going to take 100 new children for 9th grade, they might have declared only 40
seats, and then placed the other 60 outside the process.”
4See “Many Are Shut Out in High School Choice”, New York Times, March 11, 2003.
3have to be met for the system to produce substantial welfare gains over the old system.5
One goal of the present paper is to assess empirically how much student welfare is lost by
meeting these constraints, by comparing the outcomes that result from Pareto improve-
ments among students due to relaxing these constraints (if these improvements could
actually be achieved) with the best student outcomes that can be achieved by a stable
and strategy-proof mechanism. Another goal is to make clearer theoretically the tradeoﬀ
between strategy-proofness and student welfare. From this point on, we will mostly be
concerned with student welfare and incentives, and we will speak about Pareto eﬃciency
and strategy-proofness with respect to students only.
Student assignment in school choice, introduced by Abdulkadiro˘ glu and S¨ onmez (2003)
as an application of matching theory, requires the consideration of a model that allows
for indiﬀerences in school’s preferences. When school preferences are not strict, there
will not in general exist a unique stable match for each side of the market that is weakly
Pareto optimal for that side, rather there will a non-empty set of stable matches that are
weakly Pareto optimal for agents on that side. It will be useful in what follows to call any
member of that set for students a student-optimal stable matching.6
With the the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm as the basis of the new
system, the mechanism must specify how to order equivalent students from the point of
view of schools with limited space. For instance, one can assign each student a distinct
number, break ties in school preferences according to those assigned numbers, then apply
the deferred acceptance algorithm to the strict preferences that result from the tie break-
ing. This preserves the stability and strategy-proofness of the student-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm. However, tie breaking introduces artiﬁcial stability constraints
(since, after tie breaking, schools appear to have strict preferences between students for
whom they are indiﬀerent), and these constraints can harm student welfare. In other
words, when the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is applied to the strict
preferences that result from tie breaking, the outcome it produces may not in fact be a
student-optimal stable matching in terms of the original preferences.
Nevertheless, some forms of tie breaking may be preferable to others. One of the ﬁrst
design decisions we confronted was whether to assign numbers to each student at each
school (multiple tie breaking), or to give each student a single number to be used for tie
breaking at every school (single tie breaking). Computations with simulated and then
actual submitted preferences indicated that single tie breaking had superior welfare prop-
5Strategy-proofness can also be a goal in itself, as was the case in the design of the Boston school choice
system, where it came to be seen as a criterion of equal access for families with diﬀerent degrees of sophistication
about the system.
6See Bob Day and Paul Milgrom (2007) for a similar treatment of the core for auctions with non-transferable
utility, and its relation to matching.
4erties.7 The computations based on the revealed preferences will be discussed in Section
2. Proposition 2 provides some theoretical insight into the diﬀerence. We observe that if
there is a matching produced by student-proposing deferred acceptance with multiple tie
breaking that cannot be produced by deferred acceptance with single tie breaking, then
the matching is not a student-optimal stable matching.8
However, single tie breaking can also lead to a matching which is not a student-optimal
stable matching. Thus there will sometimes be a potential opportunity to improve on the
outcome of deferred acceptance with single tie breaking. Theorem 1, our main theoretical
result, implies that there exists no strategy-proof mechanism (stable or not) that Pareto
improves on the deferred acceptance algorithm with single tie breaking. That is, the
potential ineﬃciency of student-proposing deferred acceptance with single tie breaking is
the cost of strategy-proofness.
This theorem does not speak to the magnitude of the tradeoﬀ to expect in real school
choice plans. We take a step towards investigating this question using student preference
data from New York City. Our simulations reveal signiﬁcant costs of imposing strategy-
proofness: about 1,500 students or 1.9% of 8th graders in our sample could be matched
to schools they prefer over their assignment from deferred acceptance with single tie
breaking without harming any others, if the same preference information could be elicited
by a non-strategy-proof mechanism. A further (approximately) 4,300 students or 5.5%
of 8th graders in our sample could improve their assignment if we relaxed the stability
constraint, if the same rates of participation could be elicted by an unstable mechanism.
In contrast, in Boston, the welfare cost of strategy-proofness and stability are negligible.
These results raise new questions concerning when potential eﬃciency gains exist, and
whether they can be realized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 presents our main theoretical and empirical results. The last section concludes.
1 Model
A matching problem consists of a ﬁnite set of students I (for “individuals”) and a ﬁnite set
of schools S. Each school s ∈ S has qs available seats. A matching is a correspondence
µ : I ∪ S → S ∪ I such that each student is assigned either to only one school or herself,
7Tayfun S¨ onmez also played an important role in some of the early discussions of this.
8That the manner of tie breaking has important consequences for the outcome of deferred acceptance algo-
rithms (when stability is an issue) contrasts in a surprising way with the case of one-sided matching. Pathak
(2006) shows the strategy-proof top trading cycles mechanism that produces eﬃcient (but not stable) match-
ings is unaﬀected by the choice of multiple versus single tie breaking, when all schools are indiﬀerent between
students.
5and the number of students matched at each school is less than or equal to its capacity.
If µ(i) = i, i remains unmatched. If |µ(s)| < qs, some seats at school s remain unﬁlled.
Every student i has a strict preference relation Pi over schools and being unmatched,
S ∪ {i}. A school is acceptable to a student if she strictly prefers to be matched to that
school over being unmatched. Let sRis′ if sPis′ or s = s′. Every school s has a weak
preference relation Rs over students and keeping unﬁlled seats, I ∪ {s}. A student i is
acceptable to a school s if s prefers to be matched to i, iRss. Let ≻s and ∼s represent the
asymmetric and symmetric parts of Rs, respectively. To simplify, we assume that either
i ≻s s or s ≻s i, but not i ∼s s. Throughout the paper, we will assume that the preference
relation of a school s over subsets of students is responsive to Rs. This means that a
school’s preferences over groups of students is such that, for any group of students I′ with
|I′| < qs, the school prefers I′ ∪{i} to I′ ∪{j} if and only if i ≻s j, and prefers I′ ∪{i} to
I′ if and only if i ≻s s (Roth 1985). For I′ ⊂ I, let PI′ = (Pi)i∈I′ and let P−i = (Pj)j =i.
We deﬁne RS′ and R−s similarly. We ﬁx I, S, RS, and q throughout the paper.
When schools actively rank all students, this model reduces to the college admissions
model. When every school is indiﬀerent between all students, it reduces to the house allo-
cation model where there are potentially multiple places in each house. More importantly,
the model allows both types of schools, as well as schools with several indiﬀerence classes
simultaneously.
A matching µ is individually rational if it matches every x ∈ I ∪ S with agent(s)
that is(are) acceptable for x. A matching µ is blocked by (i,s) if sPiµ(i), and either
[|µ(s)| < qs and i ≻s s] or [i ≻s i′ for some i′ ∈ µ(s)]. µ is stable if µ is individually
rational and not blocked by any student-school pair (i,s). A matching µ dominates
matching ν if µ(i)Riν(i) for all i ∈ I, and µ(i)Piν(i) for some i ∈ I. A stable matching
µ is a student-optimal stable matching if it is not dominated by any other stable
matching. A matching µ is eﬃcient if there is no other matching (stable or not) which
dominates it.
A direct mechanism ϕ is a function that maps every (PI,RS) to a matching. For
x ∈ I∪S, let ϕx(PI;RS) denote the set of agents that are matched to x by ϕ. A mechanism
ϕ is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) for i ∈ I if for every (PI,RS)
and every P′
i,
ϕi(PI;RS)Riϕi(P′
i,P−i;RS).
DSIC for schools is deﬁned similarly. A mechanism is strategy-proof if it is DSIC for
all students.9
9When preferences are strict, there is no mechanism that is DSIC for students and schools (Roth 1982), and
there is no mechanism that is DSIC for schools (Roth 1985). These negative results generalize directly to our
model. Fuhito Kojima and Pathak (forthcoming) show that, as markets get large with bounded preference lists,
the ability of schools to manipulate through misstating either their preferences or their capacities gets small.
6We say that a mechanism ϕ dominates ψ if
for all PI : ϕi(PI;RS)Riψi(PI;RS) for all i ∈ I, and
for some PI :ϕi(PI;RS)Piψi(PI;RS) for some i ∈ I.
The mechanisms we will consider are based on the student-proposing deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm, which for a given proﬁle of strict preferences, produces the unique
student-optimal stable matching. The algorithm is deﬁned as follows:
Step 1: Each student proposes to her most preferred school. Each school tentatively
assigns its seats to its proposers one at a time in the order of its preference. When all of
its seats are tentatively assigned, it rejects all the proposers who remain unassigned.
In general, at
Step k: Each student who was rejected in the previous step proposes to her next preferred
school. Each school considers the set of students it has been holding and its new proposers.
It tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time in the order of its preference.
When all of its seats are tentatively assigned, it rejects all the proposers who remain
unassigned.
The algorithm terminates when no student proposal is rejected. Each student who
was tentatively assigned to some school when the algorithm ended is now assigned to that
school.
Note that the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm can be adapted to our
economy with indiﬀerences, by using any tie breaking procedure to convert the school
preferences into strict preferences, and then applying the algorithm above. A tie-breaker,
which is a bijection r : I → N, breaks ties at school s by associating Rs with a strict
preference relation Ps as follows: iPsj ⇔ [(i ≻s j) or (i ∼s j and r(i) < r(j))].
We focus on single tie breaking and multiple tie breaking rules. A single tie breaking
rule uses the same tie-breaker at each school, while a multiple tie breaking rule may use
a diﬀerent tie breaker at each school. For a particular set of tie breakers τ = (rs)s∈S,
let the mechanism DAτ be the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm acting
on the preferences (PI,PS), where Ps is obtained from Rs by breaking ties using rs, for
all s. Deﬁne DA-STB to be the mechanism DAτ where τ is a single tie breaking rule,
and DA-MTB where τ is a multiple tie breaking rule. The dominant strategy incentive
compatibility of the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism for every student
implies that DAτ is strategy-proof for any τ.
When preferences are strict, there is no individually rational matching (stable or not)
that is preferred to the unique student-optimal stable matching by every student, but even
7when preferences are strict, there may be unstable matchings at which some students do
better than the student-optimal stable match and no student does worse (Roth 1982). In
our model, there may be multiple student-optimal stable matchings. This weak Pareto
eﬃciency result generalizes for every student-optimal stable matching.10
Proposition 1. If µ is a student-optimal stable matching, there is no individually rational
matching υ (stable or not) such that υ(i)Piµ(i) for all i ∈ I.
1.1 The Model and the New York City HS Match
The model deﬁned above captures the main features of the New York City HS Match.
However, there are some diﬀerences between the model and the actual New York City
system. We brieﬂy discuss three diﬀerences here (and in more detail in the Appendix).
First, the New York City HS match consists of multiple rounds. Multiple rounds are used
to accommodate the placement of students into Specialized High Schools, which account
for about 4,000-5,000 seats a year, as well as to place unassigned and appealing students
at the conclusion of the main process. Second, in the main round of the mechanism,
students can only rank up to 12 schools of their choice. Across years of the new system,
between 72%-80% of applicants rank fewer than 12 schools. Finally, students in the top
2% of the grade 7 English Language Arts test score distribution are guaranteed their
assignment if they rank a particular type of program, known as Educational Option, as
their ﬁrst choice.
Each of these diﬀerences aﬀect the dominant strategy properties of the mechanism.11
However, as detailed in the Appendix, the consequences of these constraints are relatively
small. Moreover, the issues we consider in the rest of the paper are present even in the
absence of these constraints.12 For our empirical analysis, we will focus on the initial
rank order lists of non-Specialized schools. These rank order lists are used to assign the
vast majority of applicants. We will use all rank order lists, including those that rank
12 schools, treating those stated preferences as true preferences. The Appendix shows
that the students who rank 12 schools do not have an incentive to misreport their relative
ordering of schools, so we can in fact treat a student who receives a higher ranked school
as a obtaining a welfare improvement. We do not include students who are in the top
10Proofs not in the text are in the appendix.
11Guillaume Haeringer and Flip Klijn (2006) analyze the school choice problem when there is a constraint on
the number of schools a student may rank. They identify necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the priorities
needed to guarantee stability. Pathak and S¨ onmez (2008) show how a student-proposing deferred acceptance
mechanism where participants can rank at most k schools is manipulable at each preference proﬁle that the
mechanism where participants can rank at most l schools is manipulable, when k < l.
12For readers concerned with these idiosyncratic constraints, we report additional empirical analysis from
Boston’s school choice system which does not have these idiosyncratic features.
82% and who rank an Educational Option program as their ﬁrst choice in our calculations
because these students receive their stated top choice. The Appendix contains a thorough
discussion of these constraints and their magnitudes.13
1.2 Motivating Examples
In this section, we develop the main ideas via two examples.
Example 1. (Tie-breaking does not always yield student-optimal stable matchings.)
Tie-breaking has important welfare consequences. Suppose that school s1 is indiﬀerent
among students, students i1, i2, i3 and schools s2 and s3 have the following strict prefer-
ences:
Student Preferences
s2Pi1s1Pi1s3
s1Pi2s2Pi2s3
s1Pi3s2Pi3s3
School Preferences
i1 ∼s1 i2 ∼s1 i3
i2 ≻s2 i1 ≻s2 i3
i3 ≻s3 i1 ≻s3 i2
The stable matchings are the following:
µ1 =
 
i1 i2 i3
s1 s2 s3
!
, µ2 =
 
i1 i2 i3
s2 s1 s3
!
, µ3 =
 
i1 i2 i3
s3 s2 s1
!
.
Note that µ1, µ2 and µ3 are produced by the student proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm (DA) when the indiﬀerence in s1’s preferences is broken as i1 ≻s1 i3 ≻s1 i2,
i2 ≻s1 ix ≻s1 iy and i3 ≻s1 ix ≻s1 iy, respectively. However, µ2 dominates µ1 despite µ1
being stable. That is, DA need not produce a student-optimal stable matching even if
ties at schools are broken the same way.
An interesting comparison of single versus multiple tie breaking can be obtained via
the following variation of Example 1: If none of the schools strictly ranks students, then
the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with single tie breaking always yields
a student-optimal stable matching. On the contrary, the student-proposing deferred ac-
ceptance algorithm with multiple tie breaking yields the suboptimal matching µ1 when
ties at schools are broken as i1 ≻s1 i3 ≻s1 i2, i2 ≻s2 i1 ≻s2 i3 and i3 ≻s3 i1 ≻s3 i2. In fact,
Proposition 2 below states that given any problem, any matching that can be produced
by deferred acceptance with some multiple tie breaking, but that cannot be produced by
deferred acceptance with any single tie breaking is not a student-optimal stable matching.
13Speciﬁcally, we consider that preference lists are capped at 12, that some schools give priority to students
with top 2% reading scores if those students rank them ﬁrst, and that the matching algorithm is conducted in
multiple rounds. Because market design involves the application of theory to complex environments (which are
known to the designers in great detail), it is useful to make clear how closely a simple model corresponds to the
actual environment, and what consequences follow from the diﬀerences.
9In Example 1, what happens if one attempts to improve student welfare when DA
yields the suboptimal matching µ1? We demonstrate in the following example that such
welfare improvement yields loss of strategy-proofness.
Example 2. (Welfare enhancement involves losing strategy-proofness.)
Consider Example 1 and the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism when the
ties at s1 are broken as i1 ≻s1 i3 ≻s1 i2. We will refer to that mechanism as DAτ.
When the students’ preference proﬁle is given as in Example 1, which we refer as P, DAτ
produces µ1. Suppose that there is a strategy-proof mechanism ϕ that dominates DAτ,
and in particular produces µ2 under P.
Consider the following preference proﬁle P′, which we obtain by changing i1’s prefer-
ences in P:
s2P′
i1s3P′
i1s1
s1Pi2s2Pi2s3
s1Pi3s2Pi3s3.
Under P′, DAτ produces
µ′ =
 
i1 i2 i3
s3 s2 s1
!
.
Since ϕ dominates DAτ, ϕ must also produce µ′ under (P′;RS). Note that i1 is matched
with s3, her second choice, at µ′. But then i1 can manipulate ϕ under P′ by misrepresenting
her preferences as s2Pi1s1Pi1s3, because then ϕ matches her with s2, which she prefers to
s3, the school she is matched with by reporting truthfully. Therefore no such strategy-
proof mechanism exists for this problem.
Theorem 1, our main result, generalizes this insight.
2 Welfare Consequences of Tie Breaking
In the course of designing the New York City High School Match, policymakers from the
Department of Education were concerned with the fairness of tie breaking. Even after
the decision to use a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, they believed that
each student should receive a diﬀerent random number at each program they applied to
and this number should be used to construct strict preferences of schools for students.
Through simple examples and simulations, we suggested that single tie breaking might
have superior welfare properties to multiple tie breaking. The DOE remained unconvinced
until student preferences had already been submitted, and computational experiments
could be conducted comparing single and multiple tie breaking using actual data from the
ﬁrst round in 2003-04.
10Table 1 presents a comparison of the distribution of school assignments based on the
preferences submitted by Grade 8 applicants in New York City 2006-07. The column la-
beled Deferred Acceptance Single Tie Breaking (DA-STB) reports the average number of
students receiving their top choice, second choice, and so on under the student-proposing
deferred acceptance algorithm with a single-tie breaking rule, where tie-breakers are drawn
independently from a uniform distribution a total of 250 times. For instance, on average
32,105.3 students are matched to their ﬁrst choice, while 5,613.4 are unassigned. Simula-
tion standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
The second column reports the average number of students receiving their top choice,
second choice, and so on under the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with
a multiple-tie breaking rule (DA-MTB), where tie-breakers are drawn independently from
a uniform distribution across each school. The column reports the average from 250 inde-
pendent draws from a uniform distribution. In contrast to DA-STB, on average 29,849.9
students, or 2,255.4 fewer students receive their top choice under DA-MTB. The distri-
butions produced by the two mechanisms are statistically diﬀerent (two-sided, Wilcoxon
p < 0.001), with the mean rank received under DA-STB being less than DA-MTB.14
While the mean and the number of students receiving their top choices are higher under
DA-STB than DA-MTB, the simulations reveal that there is no stochastic dominance
ordering (weaker than Pareto dominance) between the two mechanisms. For example, the
number of students receiving their 7th choice or better is greater under DA-STB, while
the number receiving their 8th choice or better is greater under DA-MTB. However, note
that more than 89% of applicants receive their 7th choice or better.
The greater number of students obtaining one of their top choices in a similar simula-
tion and in the ﬁrst year of submitted preference data convinced New York City to employ
a single tie-breaker in their assignment system. The following result provides some insight
into the diﬀerence in the distribution of matchings produced by DA-STB and DA-MTB.
Proposition 2. For any (PI,RS), any matching that can be produced by deferred
acceptance with some multiple tie breaking, but that cannot be produced by deferred
acceptance with any single tie breaking is not a student-optimal stable matching.
In other words, the set of student-optimal stable matchings is included in the set of
stable matchings generated by a DA-STB, which is a subset of the set of stable matchings
generated by a DA-MTB.15 This result has no direct implication for the distribution of
matchings produced by both mechanisms ex ante. As we observed in the simulations,
14All statistical tests in this paper are based on the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
15A similar version of this result which states that every student-optimal stable matching can be produced by
some DA-STB was discovered independently by both Erdil (2006) and Lars Ehlers (2006). A natural question
is if there is a smaller set of tie breaking rules that will yield any student-optimal stable matching. To see that
there is not, consider a problem in which all n students have the same preferences over all schools and all schools
are indiﬀerent between students. There are n! student-optimal stable matchings, which correspond exactly to
11DA-STB and DA-MTB cannot be compared by stochastic dominance, a welfare criterion
that relies only on ordinal information about preferences. In New York City, 2006-07, out
of the 250 draws of DA-STB, none are student-optimal. This is also the case for DA-MTB.
In case of a matching that is not a student-optimal stable matching, one can easily
imagine Pareto improving the matching. Our next result states that such improvements
harm incentives: any mechanism that can Pareto improve DA with some tie breaking rule
is not strategy-proof.
Theorem 1. For any tie breaking rule τ, there is no mechanism that is strategy-proof
and dominates DAτ.
Proof. We begin by establishing the following property of a matching that dominates a
stable matching.
Claim: Suppose that ν dominates µ = DAτ(PI;RS) for a given tie-breaking rule τ. Then
the same set of students are matched in both ν and µ.
If there exists a student who is assigned under µ and unassigned under ν, then ν(i) =
iPiµ(i), which implies that µ is not individually rational, a contradiction. So every student
assigned under µ is also assigned under ν. Therefore |ν(S)| ≥ |µ(S)|. If |ν(S)| > |µ(S)|
then there exists some s ∈ S and i ∈ I such that |ν(s)| > |µ(s)| and ν(i) = s  = µ(i).
This implies that there is a vacancy at s under µ and i is acceptable for s. Furthermore,
sPiµ(i) since ν dominates µ. These together imply that µ is not stable, a contradiction.
So |ν(S)| = |µ(S)|. Then the same set of students are matched in both ν and µ since
|ν(S)| = |µ(S)| and every student assigned underµ is also assigned under ν. This completes
the proof of the claim.
Fix RS. Suppose that there exists a strategy-proof mechanism ϕ and tie-breaking rule
r such that ϕ dominates DAτ. There exists a proﬁle PI such that
ϕi(PI;RS)RiDAτ
i (PI;RS) for all i ∈ I, and
ϕi(PI;RS)PiDAτ
i (PI;RS) for some i ∈ I.
We will say that the matching ϕ(PI;RS) dominates the matching DAτ(PI;RS), where
DAτ(PI;RS) denotes the student optimal stable matching for (PI;Pτ
S).
Let si = DAτ
i (PI;RS) and ˆ si = ϕi(PI;RS) denote i’s assignment under DAτ(PI;RS)
and ϕ(PI;RS), respectively, where ˆ siPisi.
Consider proﬁle P′
I = (P′
i,P−i), where P′
i ranks ˆ si as the only acceptable school. Since
DAτ is strategy-proof, si = DAτ
i (PI;RS)RiDAτ
i (P′
I;RS), and since DAτ
i (P′
I;RS) is either
ˆ si or i, we conclude that DAτ
i (P′
I;RS) = i. Then the Claim proved above implies that
ϕi(P′
I;RS) = i.
the n! single tie breaking rules. This shows that the set of single tie breaking rules is the smallest such set.
12Now consider the economy where (P′
I;RS) are the actual preferences. In this case,
i could state Pi and be matched to ϕi(PI;RS) = ˆ si, which under P′
i she prefers to
ϕ(P′
I;RS) = i. This shows that ϕ is not strategy-proof. ⋄
In other words, any ineﬃciency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be
removed without harming student incentives. This result has close connections to three
other results. First, Erdil and Ergin’s (2008) new algorithm, stable improvement cycles,
can be used to ﬁnd a student-optimal stable matching that Pareto dominates the outcome
of student-proposing deferred acceptance with any tie breaking rule. They show that no
student-optimal stable mechanism, such as their stable improvement cycles mechanism,
is strategy-proof. Theorem 1 implies a stronger result, namely that it not possible for any
strategy-proof mechanism to Pareto improve upon deferred acceptance with tie breaking.
Onur Kesten (2004) shows that when preferences are strict, there is no strategy-proof and
Pareto eﬃcient mechanism that Pareto dominates the deferred acceptance mechanism.
Again, Theorem 1 gives a tighter bound, i.e. even when the eﬃciency requirement is
relaxed, no strategy-proof mechanism can Pareto improve upon deferred acceptance with
some tie breaking, with or without strict preferences. Finally, neither serial dictatorship
nor top trading cycles dominates deferred acceptance with single tie breaking (since they
are both strategy-proof), although neither one is dominated by deferred acceptance, since
both are Pareto eﬃcient for students. Thus, there is a tradeoﬀ between strategy-proofness
and eﬃciency, a tradeoﬀ that hinges on stability. Deferred acceptance with tie breaking, a
stable mechanism, is on the eﬃcient frontier of all strategy-proof mechanisms. Given the
importance of stability and strategy-proofness, this theorem, combined with the evidence
from the simulations with ﬁeld data and Proposition 2, supports NYC’s selection of DA-
STB, even though it does not always yield a student-optimal stable matching.
This result also allows us to interpret the lack of student-optimality associated with a
tie breaking rule as the cost of providing straightforward incentives to students. In Table 1,
the third column labeled Student-Optimal Stable Matching reports the average number
of students receiving their ﬁrst choice, second choice, and so on in a student-optimal
stable matching. This matching was computed by starting from a particular DA-STB in
column (1), and employing the stable improvement cycles procedure of Erdil and Ergin
(2008).16 The third column shows that 32,701.5 students receive their top choice in a
student-optimal stable matching, which is an improvement of 596.2 students on average.
In column (4), we report the average improvement in the ranking of the match received
in the student-optimal stable matching from DA-STB. For instance, 633.2 students on
average receive a school that is ranked one place higher on their rank order list under
the student-optimal stable matching i.e. a student who received her nth choice under
DA-STB, receives her (n − 1)th choice in a student-optimal stable matching. Similarly,
16The exact details on the implementation of stable improvement cycles are contained in the Online Appendix.
13338.6 students on average improve on their rank order list by two places, i.e. go from their
nth choice under DA-STB, to their (n−2)th choice in a student-optimal stable matching.
In total, 1,487.5 students on average receive a more preferred matching in the student-
optimal stable matching. This represents the cost of strategy-proofness associated with
DA-STB. The distribution of the student-optimal stable matching is statistically diﬀerent
from DA-STB (one-sided, p < 0.001).17
2.1 Welfare Cost of Stability
The student-optimal stable matching is not dominated by any other stable matching.
However, it is not necessarily an eﬃcient matching and thus can be dominated by an
eﬃcient matching. In this section, we compute the cost of stability by ﬁnding an eﬃcient
matching that dominates the student-optimal stable matching.
The empirical exercise starts with a student-optimal stable matching. We next ﬁnd
all welfare-enhancing swaps among assigned students across schools. These swaps are
computed by Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm, which is explained in detail in the
Supplementary Appendix. After students trade among themselves, the resulting eﬃcient
matching will dominate the student-optimal stable matching. Table 2 reports the results
of this exercise. Column (1) is the same column as Table 1’s column (3) and is the
student-optimal stable matching. The next column, labeled Eﬃcient Matching, reports
the average number of students across the 250 independent draws of the student-optimal
stable matchings from column (1) receiving their top choice, second choice, and so on
in the eﬃcient matching. In 2006-07, in Grade 8, 34,707.8 students on average receive
their ﬁrst choice, which is an improvement of 2,602.6 students. The next columns report
the magnitude of the improvement students obtain in the eﬃcient matching. Column (4)
shows that a total of 4,296.6 students obtain a school that is better than the school that
they obtained in a student-optimal stable matching. Of these students, 1,819.7 or 42.4%
go from their nth choice to their (n − 1)th choice. The distribution of eﬃcient matching
is statistically diﬀerent from the student-optimal matching (one-sided, p < 0.001).
Each of the welfare improving swaps among the students will lead to the formation of
a blocking pair of a student and a school. If the blocking pair involves a student and a
school that actively ranks applicants, then both the student and school will prefer to be
matched with each other, and have incentives to circumvent the match. If the blocking
pair involves a student and a school that only uses various ﬁxed priorities (i.e. passively
ranks applicants), then the student involved in the blocking pair will have higher priority
than the student who receives the school in the eﬃcient matching.
The last two columns of Table 2 report both types of blocking pairs that result from
17In an earlier version of this paper, we computed the same empirical exercise for 2003-04, 2004-05, and
2005-06 in New York. The quantitative results are of similar magnitudes.
14the eﬃcient matching. The total number of students involved in at least one blocking pair
is 34,898.8 on average, which corresponds to a total of 57,046 blocking pairs involving a
student and school on average across the simulations. More than 90% of the blocking
pairs involve a student and an “Educational option” program, while about 7% of the
remaining blocking pairs involve a “Screened” program.18 Since both of these program
types submit a rank order list on students, this type of violation of stability may lead
programs to circumvent their assignment by matching with diﬀerent students after the
placements have been announced.
Of the students involved in a blocking pair, 22,287.5 or 63.9% are involved in a blocking
pair at one school. 6,707.8 or 19.2% of students are involved in a blocking pair at two
schools. There are even 3.2 students on average who are involved in a blocking pair at 12
schools. These students are unassigned, but in the eﬃcient matching, there is a student
who is assigned with either lower priority or lower ranking at each of their 12 choices.
Taken together, this table shows that while 4,296.6 students on average could potentially
beneﬁt from moving to an eﬃcient matching, the consequence would be blocking pairs
involving 34,898.8 students and the majority of these blocking pairs could potentially
undermine pairwise incentives.19
2.2 Comparison to Boston
In 2005-06, Boston Public Schools changed their assignment system to one based on the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with a single tie breaker (see Abdulka-
diro˘ glu, et. al (2005, 2006)). This gives us an opportunity to investigate the quantitative
magnitudes of the constraints imposed by strategy-proofness and stability in a diﬀerent
market, in which the idiosyncratic features of NYC are absent.20
Boston diﬀers from NYC in at least two important ways. First, school choice in
Boston takes place at three entry points, elementary, middle and high school and involves
approximately 3,000-4,000 students at each of these levels. Second, the schools in Boston
do not actively rank applicants, and instead employ a priority structure based on location
and where siblings are enrolled.
Table 3 reports the average choice received by elementary school applicants in Boston
18Appendix A2 contains a description of the admissions criteria employed at both Educational Option and
Screened programs.
19In an earlier version of this paper, we computed the same empirical exercise for 2003-04, 2004-05, and
2005-06 in New York. The quantitative results are of similar magnitudes.
20The situation in Boston is diﬀerent from that in NYC in a number of important respects, which we discuss
elsewhere. For our present purpose, the main diﬀerence, we think, will be that the pattern of preferences in
Boston is diﬀerent than in NYC, due in large part to diﬀerent geographic and transportation situations, and to
the fact that in Boston, the preferences are for younger children.
15in 2006-07.21 The layout of the table mirrors Table 1. The number of students who receive
their top choice under DA-MTB (column (2)) is 2,157.3, while 2,251.8 students receive
their top choice under DA-STB (column (1)), a diﬀerence of 94.5 students on average.
The overall distribution of DA-MTB and DA-STB is statistically diﬀerent (two-sided,
p < 0.001). There is a small diﬀerence between DA-STB and the student-optimal stable
matching in Boston. Column (3) reports that 2,256.6 students obtain their ﬁrst choice in
the student-optimal matching, a diﬀerence of 4.8 from DA-STB. The diﬀerence for this
grade and year is statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels (one-sided, p = 0.01), but
for other grades, the diﬀerence is no longer signiﬁcant.
In light of Proposition 2, we also computed how many of the stable matching produced
by DA-STB are in fact student-optimal. In contrast to NYC, where none of the matchings
produced by DA-STB are student-optimal stable matchings, in Boston we ﬁnd that 6%
of the matchings produced by DA-STB are in fact student-optimal stable matchings.
However, the small diﬀerence between the student-optimal stable matching in Boston
and the outcome of DA-STB suggests that DA-STB in Boston is very close to producing
student-optimal stable matchings. Therefore, the costs of obtaining strategy-proofness by
using the DA-STB instead of the student-optimal stable matching are small.
We also computed the diﬀerence between the student-optimal stable matching and an
eﬃcient matching in Boston. For grade K2, in 2006-07, we found on average 0.26 students
received a better school. The distribution of student-optimal stable matchings was not
statistically diﬀerent from the distribution of eﬃcient matchings (one-sided, p = 0.45).
The number of blocking pairs in the eﬃcient matching for Boston’s K2 2006-07 is 1.07
averaging over 250 draws, and only 12% of matchings (30 out of 250 draws) have any
blocking pairs. That is, deferred acceptance with single tie breaking in Boston produces a
match that is very close to being a student-optimal stable match, and this is in turn very
close to being an eﬃcient match. The costs of strategy-proofness and stability in Boston
are therefore low.
3 Discussion
3.1 What happened in NYC after the new system was
adopted?
As of 2008, the new matching system in New York City has assigned nearly half a million
students to high school. Figure 1 shows the distribution of assignments received by stu-
21In an earlier version of this paper, we computed the same empirical exercise for elementary, middle and
high school applicants in 2005-06 and 2006-07 in Boston. The quantitative results are of similar magnitudes.
16dents after the Main Round for the ﬁrst four years of the new mechanism.22 In 2003-04,
31,021 students received their ﬁrst choice. In 2006-07, 6,249 more students received their
ﬁrst choice. Moreover, the cumulative distribution in 2006-07 has a higher percentage of
students receiving one of their top k choices or better (for k = 1,...,12) than in 2003-04.
In 2005-06, 38,727 students receive their top choice, the largest of the ﬁrst four years, but
this is partially due to a larger applicant pool. The percent of applicants is about 43%,
which is almost the same percentage as in 2006-07. Note that these improvements took
place without any further change in the matching algorithm.
There are many factors that might contribute to the improving performance of the
match over time. For instance, guidance counselors and school oﬃcials have become more
familiar with how the system works. Another change is that the city introduced extensive
high school fairs, which help families determine what programs are good matches for
their students. While a complete study of the factors that have led to changes in the
performance of the match is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning two
factors that may have played a role.
First, the total capacity of the programs (measured by how many students were as-
signed) was higher in later years than the ﬁrst year. While there is considerable variation
across programs, many of the highly desirable programs declared more seats in later years.
For instance, Townsend Harris High School, one of the most popular screened schools, as-
signed 216 applicants in 2003-04 and 346 in 2006-07. This type of change might be
expected from a mechanism that produces a stable outcome, since stability removes most
of the incentive to withhold positions to ﬁll later, one of the features of the system before
2003.
The second factor is that many programs are ranking more applicants. From the ﬁrst
to the second year of the match, the number of students who were ranked by programs
(counting a given student as many times as he is listed by some program) went from about
121,000 to about 213,000. In the old mechanism, many programs only considered students
who listed them as their top choice. In the new mechanism, schools do not see how they
were ranked by applicants, so some schools have to consider a larger set of applicants.
Staﬀ members at the NYC DOE have told us that after the ﬁrst year, they have strongly
encouraged programs to rank more applicants, so that they avoid having vacancies after
the match. Many schools seem to have adapted to the new system in these two ways.
3.2 Formal theory and practical design
This paper reports both formal theory and practical design, so it is useful to take a
moment to think about the close connections between the two, the gaps between them,
22The data includes both 8th and 9th grade applicants, as well as students who rank educational option
programs as their top choice, so the numbers are not directly comparable to Table 1.
17and also about how these gaps might be reduced.
We study the interaction between strategy-proofness, stability, and student welfare by
considering a strategic model in which the choices facing the students and schools are
only what preferences to submit. As we discuss in Appendix A3, this model is a fairly
close approximation—although only an approximation–to the situation facing students in
NYC when they contemplate how to rank schools. The requirement that matchings be
stable implicitly recognizes that students and schools may in reality have wider strategic
options that allow them to match with each other outside the matching system, as they
did under the prior, unstable mechanism.
Since no stable mechanism is strategy-proof for schools, but there are strategy-proof
and stable mechanisms for students, there is no way to completely satisfy the two com-
peting design objectives of stability and strategy-proofness for all agents. The argument
for focusing on strategy-proofness for students rather than schools in NYC and in other
school choice environments is not only because it lifts a burden from students and families.
Economists and social planners like strategy-proofness because it yields valuable student
preference data. (And in New York City, schools revealed by submitted preferences to be
unpopular have been closed.23) Market designers and school policy-makers like it because
it allows simple advice to be given to families about how to participate in the matching
system.
For instance, NYC School Chancellor Joel Klein stated (NY Times 10/24/03) that
the “changes are intended to reduce the strategizing parents have been doing to navigate
a system that has a shortage of good high schools.” Furthermore, Peter Kerr, another
NYCDOE oﬃcial, wrote (NY Times 11/3/03): “The new process is a vast improvement...
For example, for the ﬁrst time, students will be able to list preferences as true preferences,
limiting the need to game the system. This means that students will be able to rank schools
without the risk that naming a competitive school as their ﬁrst choice will adversely aﬀect
their ability to get into the school they rank lower.” In every year since 2003-04, the High
School directory makes a point to advise families to express their preferences truthfully.
In Boston, too, strategy-proofness was a major factor in deciding to move to a new school
choice system (cf Abdulkadiro˘ glu, et. al. 2006).
Moreover, the eﬃciency losses we calculate for students are only identiﬁable because
we have preferences that we can take as a reasonable approximation of true preferences,
since they were elicited from an algorithm that is strategy-proof for the large majority
of students. As Theorem 1 makes clear, any algorithm that would improve on DA-STB
from an eﬃciency point of view would not be strategy-proof for students. Nothing is yet
known about what kinds of preferences one could expect to be strategically submitted to
23See e.g. Elissa Gootman, ”Lafayette Among 5 High Schools to Close,” New York Times, December 14, 2006
for a report that cites demand data in the match as a reason for the closing of South Shore high school.
18such a mechanism, or what their welfare consequences would be. Consequently, there is
room for more work to further illuminate the tradeoﬀ between eﬃciency and strategy-
proofness. In particular, for what kinds of preferences will there be substantial eﬃciency
loss with DA-STB (as in New York but not in Boston)? Can these eﬃciency losses in fact
be reduced by alternative mechanisms? (cf. Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Che and Yasuda 2008, Erdil
and Ergin 2008, and Kesten and ¨ Unver 2008)24
Likewise, since the mechanism in NYC is not strategy-proof for schools, it is also
important to understand under what circumstances we expect schools to be able to act
strategically. One design decision that reduced how much NYC schools can manipulate
was to stop letting them see students’ rank order lists (see Appendix A2). Some of the
remaining ways in which the mechanism is not strategy-proof for schools are ameliorated
by the size of the system (Kojima and Pathak, forthcoming).25
On the other hand, for students, a feature of the information environment in NYC and
Boston that market designers can not change and simply have to work with is that it is
easy for parents and students to observe which schools are popular. So, a mechanism that
is theoretically manipulable by moving popular schools higher in submitted preferences
may in fact also be practically manipulable in this way in school choice environments.26
This comparison between students and schools suggests that a productive way for
theory and practical market design to advance together as we consider mechanisms that
are not strategy-proof for all agents will be to include explicit discussion about information
environments. This will need to be at least partly an empirical discussion, since the most
relevant kinds of manipulations may depend on what information is in fact available to
participants, and what kinds of manipulations are observed in the ﬁeld.27
24Erdil and Ergin (2008) take some preliminary steps in this direction by analyzing strategic behavior in
their stable improvement cycles mechanism when students have symmetric beliefs. In contrast, Abdulkadiro˘ glu,
Che and Yasuda (2008) and Kesten and ¨ Unver (2008) study eﬃciency from an ex-ante point of view. In
particular, Abdulkadiro˘ glu, Che and Yasuda (2008) introduce signaling of preference intensities in tie-breaking
to improve eﬃciency from an ex-ante point of view without harming students’ incentives; Kesten and Unver
(2008) introduce a stable and constrained ordinally eﬃcient lottery mechanism. Featherstone and Niederle
(2008) consider another ex ante perspective on the tradeoﬀs between incentives and eﬃciency.
25Under the old NYC system, which produced unstable outcomes, schools had an incentive not to reveal their
full capacity so that they could match afterwards with preferred students. This motivation is addressed by the
stability of the current system, but no stable mechanism completely eliminates the possibility of manipulation
by withholding capacity (S¨ onmez 1997, 1999). However Kojima and Pathak (forthcoming) show that these
incentives become small as the market becomes large in an appropriate way.
26Budish and Cantillon (2008) study the Harvard Business School allocation mechanism for MBA class as-
signments. They show theoretically that it is manipulable by moving popular classes higher in the submitted
rankings, and then observe empirically that it seems to be manipulated this way in practice. This is a direction
in which it might also be fruitful to investigate mechanisms like stable improvement cycles.
27In just this way, initial work on kidney exchange focused on strategy-proofness for patients and surgeons
and involving patient/donor information (Roth, S¨ onmez, and ¨ Unver 2004, 2005). After gaining some experience
193.3 Conclusions
This paper ﬁlls in some of the new theory demanded by the design of school choice
mechanisms, and shows empirically that the eﬃciency costs of strategy-proofness need
not be small. But we are much less sure how to measure the costs of not having a
strategy-proof mechanism.
When we began the design of the NYC high school match in 2003, we had a lot of
highly relevant theory to draw on, but as we looked into the particular requirements of
the NYC school match, we found ourselves running into problems beyond the available
theory, and using data, simulations and examples to make design decisions for which no
reliable theory yet existed. In the present paper, we develop some of the theory we would
have liked to have in 2003, and provide support for some of the design decisions made in
a more timely way on the basis of those early simulations and examples. In doing so, we
raise some new theoretical questions, to which it would be helpful to have answers before
the next major design (or redesign) of school matching systems.
As economists are more often asked to design practical markets and allocation mech-
anisms, this kind of feedback between theory, data, and design seems likely to become
familiar.
with the new multi-hospital clearinghouses that were formed, there are new incentive concerns about whether
transplant centers will withhold patient-donor pairs that can be matched internally (Roth 2008).
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23Appendices
A1. Proofs from Main Text
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that µ is a student-optimal stable matching for the
proﬁle (PI,RS). Construct PS from RS as follows: For every i,j such that µ(i)  = µ(j)
and i ∼µ(i) j, let iPµ(i)j. The tie breaking among other students can be done arbitrarily.
Then the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm produces µ for (PI,PS). That
is, µ is the unique student-optimal stable matching for some (PI,PS) such that PS is
consistent with RS. Then, from Roth (1982), there is no matching ν (stable or not) that
is individually rational under (PI,PS) and ν(i)Piµ(i) for all i ∈ I.
To the contrary, suppose that there is a matching ν that is individually rational under
(PI,RS) and ν(i)Piµ(i) for all i ∈ I. Since PS is consistent with RS, ν is individually
rational under (PI,PS) as well. Then ν(i)Piµ(i) for all i ∈ I contradicts with µ being the
student-optimal stable matching for (PI,PS). ⋄
Proof of Proposition 2. The result will directly follow from showing for every preference
proﬁle (PI,RS) and every student-optimal stable matching µ for that preference proﬁle,
there is a single ordering of students r such that DAr(PI,RS) = µ.
Suppose that µ is a student-optimal stable matching at some (PI,RS). For each school
s, consider the students who prefer s to their assignment in µ and are ranked highest in
Rs among such students,
B(s) = {i : sPiµ(i) and iRsj for every j such that sPjµ(j)}.
Let B(S) = ∪sB(s).
Let A be the set of students in B(S) who are assigned to a school under µ: A = {i ∈
B(S) : µ(i) ∈ S}. A stable improvement cycle consists of students {i1,...,in} ⊂ A, n ≥ 2,
such that il ∈ B(µ(il+1)) and µ(il+1)Pilµ(il) for l = 1,...,n where l + 1 is replaced by 1
when l = n (Erdil and Ergin, 2008). Since µ is student-optimal, there does not exist any
stable improvement cycle (Corollary 1, Erdil and Ergin, 2008).
Construct a directed graph with vertices (nodes) A and a directed edge from node i
to node j if µ(j)Piµ(i) and jRµ(j)i; that is, i envies j’s school place and the school j is
assigned to is indiﬀerent between i and j. Since there is no stable improvement cycle, the
directed graph must be acyclic.
We will construct an ordering based on this directed graph utilizing two properties
of the graph. First, there is a node with no incoming edges. To see this, suppose that
every node has at least one incoming edge. Then since there are a ﬁnite number of nodes,
starting from any node we can always leave a node by an incoming edge until we return
to a visited node, which leads to a cycle, and a contradiction. Second, after removing anode, we still have a directed acyclic graph, since if there is a cycle after removing a node,
then there must be a cycle in the original graph.
Construct an ordering ρ : A → {1,...,|A|} as follows: ﬁnd a node with no incoming
edges. Remove this node and all its outgoing edges. Set the value of ρ of this node to |A|.
By the two properties above, when we remove this node we still have a directed acyclic
graph and there will be a node with no incoming edges. From this graph, we iterate the
process and set the value of ρ of the next node to |A| − 1, and so on.
Next, construct an ordering r : I → N of students as follows:28 For every j,k ∈ A, set
r(j) < r(k) if ρ(j) < ρ(k). For every i ∈ I − B(S) and j ∈ A, set r(i) < r(j). Finally, for
every student l ∈ B(S) − A, set r(j) < r(l) for all j ∈ A.
Let ν = DAr(PI,RS). We will show that ν = µ. Suppose to the contrary that there
exists j ∈ I such that µ(j)  = ν(j). Since µ is student-optimal (and since students’ pref-
erences are strict), there exists some i ∈ I such that µ(i)Piν(i). Let C = {i : µ(i)Piν(i)}
be the set of students who prefer µ to ν. For any ik ∈ C, let ik+1 = ν(µ(ik)), or
ν(ik+1) = µ(ik). Since ν is stable, there is no blocking pair, so ik+1Rµ(ik)ik.
The proof by contradiction has three steps. First, we will show that for any ik ∈ C,
the student who is matched to µ(ik) under ν, ik+1, also prefers her assignment under µ
to ν and so is in C. Next, we will show that in the course of DAr(PI,RS), student i ∈ C
can only be displaced by some other student in C. Finally, we argue that ik could have
displaced ik+1, only if ik+1 were displaced herself. Therefore, no member of C can be
rejected ﬁrst, and so C must be empty.
To show the ﬁrst step, note that µ(ik+1)  = ν(ik+1). Suppose that ν(ik+1) =
µ(ik)Pik+1µ(ik+1). Then ikRµ(ik)ik+1 by stability of µ so that by construction ik+1 ∼µ(ik)
ik. But then ik+1 ∈ B(µ(ik)) so that r(ik) < r(ik+1). Then since ik ∈ C, µ(ik) =
ν(ik+1)Pikν(ik), which contradicts with stability of DAr(PI,RS) = ν. Therefore
µ(ik+1)Pik+1ν(ik+1), so ik+1 ∈ C.
We prove the second step by contradiction. Suppose that there is some i ∈ C and
j ∈ I −C such that µ(i)Pjν(j) and jRµ(i)i. Since j ∈ I −C, we have ν(j)Rjµ(j) therefore
µ(i)Pjµ(j). Then stability of µ implies that j ∼µ(i) i, which in turn implies that j ∈
B(µ(i)) so that r(i) < r(j). Therefore, no i ∈ C is rejected by µ(i) in DAr(PI,RS) in
favor of any j ∈ I − C such that µ(i)Pjν(j). This implies that every i ∈ C is rejected by
µ(i) in DAr(PI,RS) in favor of some i′ ∈ C − {i}.
Finally, in the process of DAr(PI,RS), no ik ∈ C will be rejected by µ(ik) before
ik+1 = ν(µ(ik)) is rejected by µ(ik+1). Therefore, no i ∈ C will be rejected by µ(i) in
DAr(PI,RS), so that C = ∅, i.e. ν(i)Riµ(i). Then optimality of µ implies ν(i) = µ(i) for
all i ∈ I. ⋄
28Recall that lower numbers means a student is more preferred, i.e. r(i) = 1 means that student i is the most
preferred student.
25A2. Description of New York City High School
Admissions
Each fall, about 90,000 eligible students are asked to work with their families and guidance
counselors to ﬁll out a high school application form for the following school year. Nearly
95% of students who participate in the admissions process are 8th graders, and the rest are
9th graders, many of whom were enrolled in middle schools that include grade 9. Students
receive their application in early October and the rest of the fall is devoted to gathering
information about various school options. Typically, in late October or early November,
students who are interested in attending one of the Specialized High Schools29 in New
York City take the Specialized High School Admissions Test (SHSAT). Between 25,000
and 30,000 students take the SHSAT exam every year. The Specialized High Schools
account for between 4,000 and 5,000 school seats a year.
In late November or early December, all students are asked to rank up to twelve
schools/programs on the High School Application form. Students who have taken the
SHSAT also may submit a separate rank order list expressing their preferences for spe-
cialized high schools.
Besides the specialized schools in New York City, there are three types of schools,
known as mainstream schools: 1) schools that actively evaluate applicants and submit a
ranking to the mechanism, 2) schools that do not evaluate applicants, and instead employ
priorities, which are determined not at the school, but by the Department of Education,
to order students and 3) schools at which a fraction of seats are reserved for students
who are explicitly ranked by the school, while the rest are automatically categorized into
priority groupings set by the DOE.
“Screened” and “audition” schools are examples of the ﬁrst type of school, at which
staﬀ review applicants based on criteria ranging from 7th grade academic performance,
attendance and disciplinary actions to auditions, portfolio submissions, and interviews.30
“Unscreened” schools are examples of the second type of school. Priorities include ge-
ographic location, current middle school, or other criteria.31 Finally, the third class of
29Specialized High Schools include Brooklyn Technical, High School (HS) of Math and Science at City College,
Stuyvesant, Queens HS for Science at York College, HS of American Studies at Lehman College, and the Bronx
HS of Science. Fiorello H. LaGuardia HS of Music & Art and Performing Arts is also a Specialized High School
where entrance is determined by audition and a review of academic records. After the new matching mechanism
was adopted for the 2003-04 school year, Staten Island Technical High School and Brooklyn Latin School also
became Specialized High Schools.
30For example, Townsend Harris in Flushing NY, one of the most academically rigorous screened schools,
evaluates students based on their test scores, attendance and punctuality. At Towsend Harris, all students are
required to have a minimum 90th percentile on Math and Reading standardized tests as well as a minimum
grade point average of 90 in June of 7th grade when being considered for a 9th grade seat.
31For example, the academic comprehensive program at Forest Hills, an unscreened school in Queens places
26schools, “Educational Option”, are permitted to rank students for half of their positions,
and are required to admit students according to priorities for the other half.
Nearly half of all schools are Educational Option, and more than half of total district
capacity is at schools that do not actively rank students. When priorities are used at
unscreened and Educational Option programs, many students fall into the same priority
class. For instance, at Forest Hills, an unscreened school where there were 474 seats
in 2003-04, 352 (10.7%) of student applicants are from the assignment zone while the
remaining 2,937 are from outside.
For each of the school types, neither the students nor the schools see the other
party’s rankings. All applicants are processed through a centralized match for main-
stream schools, based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. First,
each student is given a single random number. This number stays with the student across
the admissions process, and, when necessary, is used to break ties at each program. At
each screened and audition programs, the students are ordered based on a strict rank
ordering provided by the program. At unscreened programs, the priorities of applicants
are determined, and within each priority grouping, students are ordered based on this
single random number. Students applying to an Educational Option program are cate-
gorized into one of three categories based on their score on the 7th grade standardized
reading test: top 16% (High), middle 68% (Middle), and bottom 16% (Low). In the
algorithm, each Educational Option programs is split into six separate programs corre-
sponding to Low, Middle and High categories, and the Select and Random breakdowns
(LR,LS,MR,MS,HR,HS). For the half of seats for which students are ranked by the school,
high level students are ranked above middle and low level students at the high program,
middle level students are ranked above high and low level students at the middle program,
and low level students are ranked above high and middle level students at the low pro-
gram. For the other half of seats, for which students are not ranked, these same applicants
are ordered based on their test score category, and the single random number is used to
break ties and construct a strict ordering. The rank order list of a student who applies
to an educational option program is modiﬁed to rank these six “virtual” subprograms
according to the order HR, HS, MR, MS, LR, LS. The preferences are modiﬁed in the
same way for each student. Finally, any student who scored in the top two percent on
the 7th grade standardized reading test will automatically be matched to an Educational
Option program if she lists it as her ﬁrst choice.
Once applications are submitted, the assignment algorithm is organized into three
rounds. The ﬁrst round exists to accommodate the placement of the students who are
given an oﬀer at a Specialized High School. Specialized High Schools admissions are
students who live in an attendance zone near the school in a higher priority class than students from outside
the priority zone.
27administered separately, but because of their special position in NYC history, applicants
with a Specialized school oﬀer also receive an oﬀer from a mainstream school, and have a
choice between the two.32 The student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism produces
a mainstream school assignment for each student in the ﬁrst round. At the end of the ﬁrst
round, only students who have received an assignment at a Specialized High School are
informed of their placement from the mainstream schools, together with their Specialized
assignment and are asked to pick one of these two oﬀers. The number of such students
ranges between 4,000 and 5,000 a year. Since students who receive a placement from a
Specialized High School have performed well on the SHSAT, between 50 and 60% of these
students receive their top choice mainstream school, and between 75-85% are placed to
one of their top three choices. Of those receiving an oﬀer, between 60 and 78% of these
students take their Specialized High School placement, and of those who do not, 60-70%
take their top choice assignment.
Once the students who obtain a Specialized oﬀers are ﬁnalized, the capacities at each
program are adjusted to remove these placed students. Next, the students who did not
receive a Specialized oﬀer, and the students who did not apply to Specialized High Schools
are assigned through the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the second
round. The student preferences are the same as those used for the ﬁrst round. The
second round, also known as the Main round, produces an assignment for the majority
of students. In 2003-04, 40.2% of students were assigned to their ﬁrst choice at the end
of the Main round. This number improved to 46.5% in the 2006-07 assignment. 1.1% of
students in 2003-04 were assigned to their 12th and last choice and this number fell to
0.2% in 2006-07. The distribution of assignments from 2003-04 to 2006-07 is presented in
the Online Appendix.
If a student is not matched in the main round, she has the opportunity to select up to
12 new schools in the third round, also known as the Supplementary Round. The schools
students may consider are those with remaining capacity, and are almost exclusively
unscreened or zoned programs. Students who are not able to be matched to one of their
choices will be assigned to an available high school as near to their homes as possible. All
32Placement at Specialized schools is determined by a serial dictatorship in which students are ordered based
on their score on the SHSAT, and an even tie breaker is used to order students with the same score. That
is, the student with the highest test score is placed to her most preferred school, and the student with the
next highest test score is assigned to her most preferred school with remaining capacity. A small fraction of
seats are assigned at these schools as a result of a Discovery Program, which gives disadvantaged students of
demonstrated high potential an opportunity to try the specialized high school program. These students must
be near the SHSAT cutoﬀ, be certiﬁed as disadvantaged, and be recommended by their middle schools. At
the LaGuardia programs, students are given oﬀers at the programs that accept them after their audition and
portfolio submission. For all of the other Specialized High Schools, students can only obtain a single oﬀer. It is
possible for a student to receive an oﬀer from both LaGuardia and another Specialized High School, in addition
to a mainstream oﬀer.
28students are placed at the conclusion of the Supplementary Round.
Finally, the oﬃce of high school enrollment runs an appeals process each year. In 2003-
04, there were no plans for a formal appeals process. Students who were unhappy with
their assignment were invited to write a letter to the Department of Education explaining
the reason for their appeal, and a list of programs where they would prefer to be assigned.
When DOE received more than 5,000 letters, plans were drawn up for a formal appeals
process. While still evolving, the current appeals process invites applicants to ﬁle for
an appeal after the Supplementary Round placements, usually in late May. Students
are asked to meet with their guidance counselor to obtain an appeals form which asks
them to explain the reason for their appeal and to list up to three programs in order
of preference the student wants as a replacement for their assignment. Students must
also explain a reason for their appeal as either 1) Change of Home Address, 2) Change
of School Location, 3) Entitled Services Unavailable, 4) New Small High School, and 5)
Other, and each appeal requires veriﬁcation of the reason. When a student appeals, they
also have the option to retain the right to their assigned school if they cannot be placed to
one of the three alternatives. In 2006-07, the NYC DOE evaluated appeals and classiﬁed
them into either valid or invalid appeals, and processed only those they considered valid.
Further details are contained in the Online Appendix.
A3. Relationship between the Model and Actual
NYC System
This section describes the diﬀerences between the actual NYC high school admissions
process and the model analyzed in the main text, and describes some empirical features
of these diﬀerences. In the Online Appendix, we formally demonstrate that, even though
high schools have multiple seats, for the questions concerning the choices facing students
when they can submit no more than 12 schools there is no loss of generality in considering
a one-to-one matching model.
A3.1. Students may rank no more than 12 choices
The ﬁrst issue that we focus on is that students can only rank 12 schools. The model in
the text analyzes the school choice problem when there is no constraint on the number
of schools a student may rank. Between 22% and 30% of applicants present in Round 1
rank 12 choices.33 This represents the maximum number of students who are aﬀected by
this constraint who may have wanted to rank more than 12 choices. It is also possible
33A table that shows the distribution of the length of the rank order list in Round 1 across years is presented
in the supplementary appendix.
29that a fraction of these students actually preferred exactly 12 schools, and the number
of students ranking 11 choices is a rough approximation of this number. Students who
wish to rank more than 12 choices face an incentive problem. However, the preference
revelation problem for these students involves selecting which 12 of their preferred schools
they submit to the mechanism, according to the order they want.
Proposition (Haeringer and Klijn, Lemma 8.1.): In the student-proposing deferred
acceptance mechanism where a student may only rank k schools,
• if a student prefers fewer than k schools, then she can do no better than submitting
her true rank order list,
• if a student prefers more than k schools, then she can do no better than employing
a strategy which selects k schools among the set of schools she prefers to being
unassigned and ranking them according to her true preference ordering.
Lastly, it is of note that the number of participants receiving their 12th choice is less
than 1% of all applicants. Moreover, students ranking 12 choices are rarely unassigned in
Round 1 or Round 2.
A3.2. Top 2% Priority at Educational Option Programs
Students who score in the top two percent on the standardized reading exam in grade 7
are guaranteed an Educational Option program only if they rank it as their top choice. A
student who does not prefer an Educational Option program as her top choice may have
an incentive to rank it as her top choice so that she receives it. The following proposition
summarizes the incentive problem faced by such applicants.
Proposition: In the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism where a student
can rank at most k schools, if a student is guaranteed a placement at a school only if she
ranks it ﬁrst, then she can do no better than
• either ranking that program as her ﬁrst choice, and submit the rest of her preferences
according to her true preference ordering, or
• submitting her preferences by selecting at most k schools among the set of schools
she prefers to being unassigned and ranking them according to her true preference
ordering.
The proposition, the proof of which we defer to the Online Appendix, shows that while
the student does not have a dominant strategy, she does have a strategy which is relatively
simple. In particular, it shows that if a student does not rank an Educational Option
program as her top choice, she cannot beneﬁt by reversing the order of any school she
30prefers. In 8th grade, there are between 1,900 and 3,600 students who receive Educational
Option priority. Since these are students who have performed well in grade 7, many of
these students are competitive for a spot at a Specialized High School, and between 30-35%
of applicants accept a Specialized High School oﬀer. Investigating the student rank order
lists, between 22-36% of applicants exercise their ed-opt priority and rank an educational
option school ﬁrst. In light of the proposition above, this represents an upper bound on
the number of students who may have manipulated and ranked an Educational Option
program above a program they prefer. Some of these students may actually prefer an
Educational Option program as their top choice even in the absence of the priority they
receive by ranking the school. For a comparison, a larger fraction of between 33-41% of
the population who are not in the top 2% category rank an Educational Option program
as their top choice.
A3.3. Multiple Rounds
The last distinction between the model and the actual NYC high school admissions process
is due to multiple rounds. First, a student who takes the SHSAT in Round 1, receives
a specialized oﬀer but prefers her mainstream oﬀer may face a strategic disadvantage for
having applied in Round 1 at her mainstream school. In this round, the student will be
competing against a larger set of students and this may cause her to not receive her top
choice mainstream school. Had she, instead, not received an oﬀer from a specialized high
school, she would be processed through the main round after the students who received a
specialized oﬀer were removed from the match. Since students who receive a placement
from a specialized high school have performed well on the SHSAT, between 50 and 60%
of these students receive their top choice mainstream school. Of the remaining fraction of
students, between 17-34% of students take a mainstream oﬀer which is not their top choice
over their specialized oﬀer. This corresponds to between 365-816 students who might have
fared better by not applying to a Specialized High School. Note it is also possible that
students who accepted their specialized oﬀer and who did not receive their top choice
mainstream school would have taken their mainstream school if they received their top
choice mainstream school. But since these students accepted their Specialized oﬀer, we do
not know if they preferred their Specialized oﬀer to their top choice mainstream school.
The set of schools that are available in Round 3 are those with remaining capacity
after the Main Round. Thus, if a student had ranked any program that is available
to applicants in Round 3, then they would have received a placement there. The only
students who could be aﬀected by this calculation are those ranking 12 choices. These
students might have been better ranking a school with available seats in Round 3 on their
rank order list. However, as we have discussed, the fraction of students receiving their
12th choice is less than 1% of all applicants, and students who rank 12 schools are almost
31never unassigned.
The last potential strategic issue facing students is whether they may obtain a place-
ment for which they can ﬁle an appeal. Since under the current system, each appeal is
ﬁrst deemed valid or not, we suspect this is not a major issue.
32Table 1| Tie-breaking for Grade 8 Applicants in NYC in 2006-07
Deferred Acceptance Deferred Acceptance Student-Optimal Improvement from Number
Choice Single Tie-Breaking Multiple Tie-Breaking Stable Matching DA-STB to of Students
DA-STB DA-MTB Student-Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 32,105.3 (62.2) 29,849.9 (67.7) 32,701.5 (58.4) +1 633.2 (32.1)
2 14,296.0 (53.2) 14,562.3 (59.0) 14,382.6 (50.9) +2 338.6 (22.0)
3 9,279.4 (47.4) 9,859.7 (52.5) 9,208.6 (46.0) +3 198.3 (15.5)
4 6,112.8 (43.5) 6,653.3 (47.5) 5,999.8 (41.4) +4 125.6 (11.0)
5 3,988.2 (34.4) 4,386.8 (39.4) 3,883.4 (33.8) +5 79.4 (8.9)
6 2,628.8 (29.6) 2,910.1 (33.5) 2,519.5 (28.4) +6 51.7 (6.9)
7 1,732.7 (26.0) 1,919.1 (28.0) 1,654.6 (24.1) +7 26.9 (5.1)
8 1,099.1 (23.3) 1,212.2 (26.8) 1,034.8 (22.1) +8 17.0 (4.1)
9 761.9 (17.8) 817.1 (21.7) 716.7 (17.4) +9 10.2 (3.1)
10 526.4 (15.4) 548.4 (19.4) 485.6 (15.1) +10 4.7 (2.0)
11 348.0 (13.2) 353.2 (12.8) 316.3 (12.3) +11 2.0 (1.1)
12 236.0 (10.9) 229.3 (10.5) 211.2 (10.4)
unassigned 5,613.4 (26.5) 5,426.7 (21.4) 5,613.4 (26.5) Total: 1,487.5
Notes: Data from the main round of the New York City High School Admissions Process in 2006-07 for students requesting
an assignment for Grade 9 (high school). Column (1) reports the average choice received distribution of applicants from the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with single tie-breaking (DA-STB). Column (2) reports the average choice received
distribution of applicants from the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with school-speci¯c tie breaking. Column (3)
reports the average choice received distribution of applicants in a student-optimal stable matching, which is computed from DA-STB
followed by stable improvement cycles. Column (4) reports the average number of students and how many places on their rank
order list students improve in the student-optimal stable matching relative to the the matching produced by DA-STB. Columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4) are based on 250 random draws. Simulation standard errors are reported in parenthesis.Table 2| Welfare Consequences of Stability for Grade 8 Applicants in in 2006-07
Student-Optimal E±cient Improvement from Count of Students
Choice Stable Matching Matching Student-Optimal Number k with k Blocking
Stable Matching Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 32,701.5 (58.4) 34,707.8 (50.5) +1 1,819.7 (41.3) 1 22,287.5 (205.1)
2 14,382.6 (50.9) 14,511.4 (51.1) +2 1,012.8 (26.4) 2 6,707.8 (117.9)
3 9,208.6 (46.0) 8,894.4 (41.2) +3 592.0 (19.5) 3 2,991.0 (79.6)
4 5,999.8 (41.4) 5,582.1 (40.3) +4 369.6 (16.0) 4 1,485.4 (56.5)
5 3,883.4 (33.8) 3,492.7 (31.4) +5 212.5 (12.0) 5 716.6 (32.5)
6 2,519.5 (28.4) 2,222.9 (24.3) +6 132.1 (9.1) 6 364.6 (22.9)
7 1,654.6 (24.1) 1,430.3 (22.4) +7 77.0 (7.1) 7 183.1 (13.6)
8 1,034.8 (22.1) 860.5 (20.0) +8 43.0 (5.6) 8 85.6 (10.9)
9 716.7 (17.4) 592.6 (16.0) +9 26.3 (4.5) 9 44.7 (6.4)
10 485.6 (15.1) 395.6 (13.7) +10 11.6 (2.8) 10 22.6 (4.9)
11 316.3 (12.3) 255.0 (10.8) +11 4.8 (2.0) 11 9.9 (3.0)
12 211.2 (10.4) 169.2 (9.3) 12 3.2 (1.6)
unassigned 5,613.4 (26.5) 5,613.4 (26.5) Total: 4,296.6 34,898.8
Notes: Data from the main round of the New York City High School Admissions Process in in 2006-07 for students requesting
an assignment for Grade 9 (high school). Column (1) reports the average choice received distribution of applicants in a student-
optimal stable matching, which is computed from DA-STB followed by stable improvement cycles. Column (2) reports the average
choice received distribution of applicants in a Pareto e±cient matching, computed with Gale's top trading cycles, which dominates
the matching in column (1). Column (3) reports the average number of students and how many places on their rank order list
students improve in the e±cient matching relative to a student-optimal stable matching. Column (4) reports the average number
of students who form k di®erent blocking pairs in the e±cient matching. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) are based on 250 random
draws. Simulation standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
2Table 3| Tie-breaking for Elementary School Applicants in Boston in 2006-07
Deferred Acceptance Deferred Acceptance Student-Optimal Improvement from Number
Choice Single Tie-Breaking Multiple Tie-Breaking Stable Matching DA-STB to of Students
DA-STB DA-MTB Student-Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 2,251.8 (8.4) 2,157.3 (13.4) 2,256.6 (8.2) +1 4.6 (2.6)
2 309.8 (10.3) 355.5 (12.0) 307.4 (10.0) +2 1.2 (1.1)
3 154.9 (7.9) 189.3 (10.1) 154.0 (7.7) +3 0.5 (0.7)
4 59.7 (5.5) 76.1 (7.0) 58.7 (5.5) +4 0.3 (0.5)
5 27.4 (4.5) 34.1 (4.8) 27.0 (4.4) +5 0.0 (0.1)
6 4.9 (1.9) 6.0 (2.5) 4.9 (1.9) +6 0.0 (0.1)
7 2.6 (1.4) 2.8 (1.6) 2.5 (1.4) +7 0.0 (0.1)
8 1.9 (1.2) 0.9 (0.9) 1.9 (1.2) +8 0.0 (0.1)
9 1.2 (1.1) 0.4 (0.6) 1.2 (1.0) +9 0.0 (0.0)
10 0.3 (0.6) 0.1 (0.2) 0.3 (0.5)
unassigned 112.4 (4.6) 104.6 (4.5) 112.4 (4.6) Total: 6.5
Notes: Data from Boston Public School's student assignment process in Round 1 in 2006-07 for students requesting an as-
signment for Grade K2 (elementary school). Column (1) reports the average choice received distribution of applicants from the
student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with single tie-breaking (DA-STB). Column (2) reports the average choice received
distribution of applicants from the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm with school-speci¯c tie breaking. Column (3)
reports the average choice received distribution of applicants in a student-optimal stable matching, which is computed from DA-
STB followed by stable improvement cycles. Column (4) reports the average number of students and how many places on their
rank order list students improve in the student-optimal stable matching relative to the matching produced by DA-STB. Columns
(1), (2), (3) and (4) are based on 250 random draws. Simulation standard errors are reported in parenthesis.0
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Figure 1: Distribution of Choices Received in Round 1 or 2 by Year
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This appendix provides supplementary material for “Strategy-proofness versus Eﬃ-
ciency in Matching with Indiﬀerences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match.” The
numbering of sections parallels portions of the Appendix (i.e. A2’ corresponds to Ap-
pendix A2).
A2’: Description of New York City High School
Admissions
The following table summarizes the distribution of assignments from students in Round
1 and Round 2.
Table A2: Distribution of Assignments
from Round 1 and Round 2 in New York City
Choice 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
1 31,021 (40.2%) 33,083 (41.4%) 38,727 (47.0%) 37,270 (46.5%)
2 12,504 (16.2%) 14,818 (18.6%) 16,524 (20.1%) 15,898 (19.8%)
3 8,713 (11.3%) 9,929 (12.4%) 9,882 (12.0%) 9,845 (12.3%)
4 6,587 (8.5%) 6,927 (8.7%) 6,308 (7.7%) 6,369 (7.9%)
5 4,893 (6.3%) 4,739 (5.9%) 3,984 (4.8%) 4,051 (5.1%)
6 3,652 (4.7%) 3,415 (4.3%) 2,699 (3.3%) 2,532 (3.2%)
7 2,682 (3.5%) 2,246 (2.8%) 1,603 (1.9%) 1,629 (2.0%)
8 2,160 (2.8%) 1,651 (2.1%) 1,054 (1.3%) 978 (1.2%)
9 1,635 (2.1%) 1,149 (1.4%) 688 (0.8%) 681 (0.8%)
10 1,376 (1.8%) 786 (1.0%) 440 (0.5%) 436 (0.5%)
11 1,063 (1.4%) 600 (0.8%) 291 (0.4%) 275 (0.3%)
12 877 (1.1%) 476 (0.6%) 205 (0.2%) 184 (0.2%)
A3’: Relationship between the Model and Actual
NYC System
This section describes the relationship between the model in the main text and the actual
New York City high school assignment process.A3.1’: Students may rank no more than 12 choices
The following table shows the distribution of the length of the rank order list in Round 1
across years.
Table A3.1: Length of Applicant ROLs in Round 1
2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07
1 7,907 (8.47) 6,123 (6.59) 6,648 (7.18) 6,786 (7.48)
2 4,967 (5.32) 4,369 (4.70) 4,808 (5.20) 4,683 (5.16)
3 6,332 (6.79) 6,048 (6.51) 6,694 (7.23) 6,615 (7.29)
4 6,722 (7.2) 6,697 (7.21) 7,670 (8.29) 7,490 (8.26)
5 6,817 (7.31) 7,159 (7.71) 8,109 (8.76) 8,098 (8.93)
6 6,504 (6.97) 7,480 (8.05) 8,194 (8.86) 8,115 (8.95)
7 5,607 (6.01) 6,320 (6.81) 6,990 (7.55) 7,026 (7.75)
8 5,386 (5.77) 5,798 (6.24) 6,123 (6.62) 6,336 (6.99)
9 4,808 (5.15) 4,841 (5.21) 4,971 (5.37) 5,286 (5.83)
10 5,741 (6.15) 4,952 (5.33) 4,804 (5.19) 5,025 (5.54)
11 8,647 (9.27) 5,561 (5.99) 5,261 (5.69) 5,269 (5.81)
12 23,875 (25.59) 27,524 (29.64) 22,260 (24.06) 19,952 (22.00)
A3.2’: Top 2% Priority at Educational Option Programs
Proposition: In the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism where a student
can rank at most k schools, if a student is guaranteed a placement at a school only if she
ranks it ﬁrst, then she can do no better than
• either ranking that program as her ﬁrst choice, and submit the rest of her preferences
according to her true preference ordering, or
• submitting her preferences by selecting at most k schools among the set of schools
she prefers to being unassigned and ranking them according to her true preference
ordering.
Proof: Consider a student with a guaranteed placement at a school. Given her pref-
erences, partition her set of strategies into two sets: The ﬁrst set consists of preference
list of at most k schools that rank her guaranteed school as ﬁrst choice. The second set
consists of all other preference lists of at most k schools. We will show that her optimal
strategy lies either in the ﬁrst or the second set.She is indiﬀerent among all the preference lists in the ﬁrst set, as she is guaranteed
her guaranteed school by submitting any of those preference lists. So, there is no loss of
generality in considering a particular strategy from this set, namely the one that ranks
the guaranteed school as her ﬁrst choice, and ranks the rest of her preferences according
to her true preference ordering.
By the proposition above, her optimal strategy among the ones in the second set ranks
schools in her true preference ordering, yielding the desired conclusion. ⋄
A4’: Ex Ante Comparison of DA-STB and DA-
MTB
Let pk
i be the probability that student i receives her kth choice. An allocation is a vector of
probabilities pi = (p1
i,...,pn
i ) for each item on the rank order list Pi such that
Pn
k=1 pk
i = 1.
We will say that an allocation pi ordinally dominates an allocation qi for student i, if
for all m = 1,..,n,
m X
k=1
pk
i ≥
m X
k=1
qk
i ,
with strict inequality for some m. An allocation vector p = (pi) stochastically dominates
q = (qi) if pi stochastically dominates qi for some i, and does no worse for all i.
Proposition. There is no ordinal dominance relationship between DA-STB and DA-
MTB.
Proof. We present an example where there is no ordinal dominance relationship. Consider
an economy with three students i1,i2,i3 and three schools, s1,s2,s3, each with one seat.
Suppose student preferences are:
i1 : s1 ≻ s2 ≻ s3
i2 : s3 ≻ s1 ≻ s2
i3 : s1 ≻ s3 ≻ s2
Suppose three schools are indiﬀerent between all applicants. Then DA-STB induces
the following distribution over matchings:
1
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DA-MTB induces the following distribution over matchings:1
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.
Student i3 is more likely to receive her ﬁrst or second choice under DA-MTB than
DA-STB, while student i1 is more likely to receive her ﬁrst or second choice under DA-
STB than DA-MTB. Therefore, there is no ordinal dominance relationship between the
two mechanisms. ⋄
A5’: Implementation of the Stable Improvement
Cycles Algorithm
This section describes the Stable Improvement Cycles algorithm of Erdil and Ergin (2008)
and explain its implementation. The data we use for New York is for all 8th grade
applicants in Round 1 of the New York City High School match. If an applicant is
marked as a student who receives top 2% priority at an Educational Option school and
ranks the school as their top choice, we do not include the applicant in these tables.
The data we use for Boston is all elementary (Grade K2), middle (Grade 6), and high
school (Grade 9) applicants in Round 1 for 2005-06 and 2006-07, when Boston employed
a student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to place students. These students will
be receiving their top choice and thus will not be aﬀected by a stable improvement cycle.
If an applicant ranked 12 schools, we work with the stated rank order list. Given a stable
matching µ, deﬁne the following: Let As be the set of students assigned to school s under
µ; Bs be the set of students who are ranked highest by s among all who prefer s to their
assignment. Formally,
As = {i ∈ I : µ(i) = s},
Bs = {i ∈ I : sPiµ(i) and iRsj for all j such that sPjµ(j)}.
A stable improvement cycle is a list of distinct students i1,...,in ≡ i0, n ≥ 2, such that
µ(il) ∈ S and il ∈ Bµ(il+1) for l = 0,...,n − 1. We implement a stable improvement cycle
by forming a new matching µ′ as
µ′(i) =
(
µ(i) if i / ∈ {i0,...,in−1}
µ(il+1) if i = il for some l = 0,...,n − 1
We start with a single tie breaking rule and matching produced by the associated
DA-STB.Given a stable matching, we construct a directed graph as follows: The nodes of the
graph are schools. We draw an edge from school s to school s′ if there is a student i such
that µ(i) = s and i ∈ Bs′. We also associate that edge with the set of all such students,
denoted by Ess′. Formally,
Ess′ = {i ∈ I : µ(i) = s and i ∈ Bs′}
Students in Ess′ are sorted according to the given tie breaking rule. Let Es be the set of
edges originating from s. During a search for a cycle, schools are tried in the alphabetical
order. In particular, we start the search for a stable improvement cycle with the ﬁrst
school in the alphabetical order. If we cannot ﬁnd a cycle after starting the search with
a school, we restart the search with the next school in the alphabetical order. When
we reach a school s in our search, we continue our search with the schools in Es in the
alphabetical order. When a student is to be moved from s to s′ in cycle, the last student
i in Ess′ is moved from s to s′. Then i is removed from all Ess′′ for every s′′ ∈ S\{s}. We
ﬁnd and implement all the cycles in the graph. Then we repeat these steps with the new
matching until no cycle is found.
A6’: Tradeoﬀ between Stability and Eﬃciency
As we mention in the text, we take only students’ preferences into account for welfare
considerations. In order to measure the cost of stability associated with a student-optimal
stable matching µ, we ﬁnd a Pareto eﬃcient matching that Pareto dominates µ.
If a matching is not Pareto eﬃcient, we ﬁnd a Pareto eﬃcient matching that Pareto
dominates it from the perspective of students via Gale’s top trading cycle algorithm as
follows:
If a matching of students to schools, µ, is not Pareto eﬃcient, then there exits a cycle
of students i1,i2,...,in+1 ≡ i1, n ≥ 2, such that il prefers il+1’s matched school over her
match, that is µ(il+1)Pilµ(il), l = 1,...,n. A new matching TTC(µ) can be obtained by
picking an arbitrary cycle i1,i2,...,in+1 ≡ i1, and transferring every il to il+1’s matched
school:
TTC(µ)(i) =
(
µ(il+1) if i = il for some l = 1,...,n
µ(i) otherwise
TTC(µ) Pareto dominates µ. Therefore, a Pareto eﬃcent matching that Pareto dominates
µ can be found as the limit of µt+1 = TTC(µt) where µ0 = µ. The limit is obtained in
ﬁnite steps by ﬁniteness of the model.